Capital productivity in industrialized economies: evidence from error-correction model and Lagrange Multiplier tests by Trofimov, Ivan D.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Capital productivity in industrialized
economies: evidence from
error-correction model and Lagrange
Multiplier tests
Ivan D. Trofimov
Kolej Yayasan Saad (KYS) – KYS Business School, Malaysia
29 September 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/81655/
MPRA Paper No. 81655, posted 30 September 2017 10:49 UTC
 1 
 
Capital productivity in industrialised economies: evidence from 
error-correction model and Lagrange Multiplier tests 
Ivan D. Trofimov* 
Abstract 
The paper re-examines the “stylized facts” of the balanced growth in developed 
economies, looking specifically at capital productivity variable. The economic data is 
obtained from European Commission AMECO database, spanning 1961-2014 period. 
For a sample of 22 OECD economies, the paper applies univariate LM unit root tests 
with one or two structural breaks, and estimates error-correction and linear trend 
models with breaks. It is shown that diverse statistical patterns were present across 
economies and overall mixed evidence is provided as to the stability of capital 
productivity and balanced growth in general. Specifically, both upward and 
downward trends in capital productivity were present, while in several economies 
mean reversion and random walk patterns were observed. The data and results were 
largely in line with major theoretical explanations pertaining to capital productivity. 
With regard to determinants of the capital productivity movements, the structure of 
capital stock and the prices of capital goods were likely most salient.  
  
JEL Codes: C12, C22, N10, O47 
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1. Introduction 
 
The idea that several economic variables are roughly constant over the course of 
economic growth has been central to economic theory in general and growth and 
distribution theories in particular. It dates back to early works by N. Kaldor (1961), 
who argued that economies operate at near balanced growth paths and that certain 
“stylized facts” are present. It was posited specifically (Kaldor, 1961, pp. 177-222; 
Jones & Romer, 2009, p. 2) that: 1). Labour productivity (Y/L) and capital per worker 
(capital intensity – K/L) grow at sustained and roughly similar rates with no tendency 
to fall; 2). Rates of return on capital remain steady; 3). Capital-output ratio (K/Y) 
shows no systematic trend; 4). Shares of labour and capital in national income remain 
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stable; 5). There exist considerable variations in the rate of growth among fast 
growing countries, as well as in the rate of growth of productivity across countries. 
 
Following Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) and Romer (1989) among others, the identity-
type relationships between the facts are acknowledged. Firstly, the rate of return on 
capital is a product of capital productivity (the inverse of capital-output ratio), and 
capital share. Secondly, the product of labour productivity and the inverse of capital 
intensity gives capital productivity (Y/L x L/K = Y/K). Thereby, the stability of the 
capital productivity and labour share implies stability of the rate of return. Likewise, 
the rate of change in capital productivity is sustained, if labour productivity and 
capital intensity grow at similar rates.  
 
Capital productivity is thus a salient variable that reflects the patterns of technical 
change and that also determines the level of profitability in the economy. The purpose 
of the paper is to examine the dynamics of capital productivity in the industrialised 
economies, specifically to consider its statistical properties (stationarity versus mean 
reversion and random walk), its interaction with labour productivity, capital intensity 
and other relevant variables, and its implications for technical change, and balanced 
growth in the respective economies.  
 
As put by Evans (2000, pp. 4-5) the theoretical economic growth literature tends to 
express the stylised facts in terms of constancy of factor shares, capital-output ratio 
and return on capital, while the real economies are inevitably stochastic economies. 
Hence, we consider it more appropriate to analyse respective variables using terms 
“steady”, “stable”, and “mean reverting”, and adopt this terminology throughout the 
paper.  
 
The paper introduces two novelties. Firstly, it examines the balanced growth stylized 
facts as originally formulated by Kaldor, in contrast to more recent “balanced growth 
literature” (King et al., 1991, p. 819) that looks for empirical support of Kaldor’s 
facts based on consumption, investment and output variables (specifically considering 
consumption/output and investment/output ratios). Secondly, while Kaldor’s stylized 
facts are supposed to hold in the long-run, breaks and other disruptions to the 
balanced growth may nonetheless be present in the short-run. In this connection, the 
paper incorporates the analysis of the structural breaks into trend and error-correction 
modelling, as well as employs recently developed Lagrange Multiplier (LM) unit root 
tests with one or two structural breaks. Thirdly, a relationship between capital 
productivity and other relevant variables is examined in a narrative form. 
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2. Literature review 
 
The stylized facts of balanced growth have been the cornerstone of neoclassical 
growth models. They were also a research object in a number of studies, both the 
analyses of individual stylized facts, as well as “multi-fact” studies. These were 
principally concerned with the empirical testing of long-run relationships between 
output, investment and consumption within neoclassical growth models framework 
(Kunst & Neusser, 1990; King et al., 1991; Mills, 2001; Harvey, 2003; Li & Daly, 
2009, among others). The balanced growth patterns were identified in some cases, 
and rejected in the others.  
 
Evans (2000, pp. 14-15) examined Kaldor’s stylised facts in the post-war US context 
using trend regressions and Dickey-Fuller unit root tests. He concluded that in the 
period considered the capital-output ratio, the net rate of return on capital, the net 
share of capital in output and the net investment rate have all been mean reverting. 
The growth rate of per capita output was also mean reverting and did not show 
downward trend. The Kaldor facts held despite sharp decline in capital-output ratio 
and sharp increase in the return to capital during WWII years. 
 
The comparative empirical testing of the stylized facts of economic growth using 
Penn tables has recently been performed by Steger (2001) in the context of 
developing economies. However, the facts examined were different from those 
originally formulated by Kaldor and concerned the diversity of growth rates, 
correlation between savings rate and economic growth rate, between the growth rate 
and the level of income per capita, as well as convergence / divergence of per capita 
income. 
 
Analysis of labour share and labour productivity concerned identification of factors 
that were responsible for slowdown and non-uniform growth rates of labour 
productivity (Nordhaus, 2002; Gordon, 2012, among others) or for deterioration of 
labour share (Acemoglu, 2002; Torrini, 2005; Dunhaupt, 2012).  
 
The studies that examined capital intensity focused specifically at dynamics of factor 
proportions in economic growth and concluded that capital-labour ratio has been 
rising in the developed economies, albeit without investigating whether the growth 
was steady or declining (Mills, 2009;  Karabarbounis & Neiman, 2014). The study by 
Lawrence (2015, p. 4) stands as exception, arguing in favour of declining effective 
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capital-labour ratios in the US, resulting from the preponderant labour-augmenting 
(instead of labour-saving) technical change at both aggregate and industry levels. 
 
The early analysis of capital productivity and capital-output ratio by Denison (1967) 
confirmed Kaldor stylised fact: the level of capital-output ratio was remarkably 
constant across countries of differing stages of development, implying that capital-
output ratio is steady over time. In contrast, Klein and Kosobud (1961) based on the 
US data spanning 1900-1953 estimated linear trend model and established significant 
downward trend in capital productivity. More recent analyses of the fact included 
Mills (2009), Madsen et al. (2012) and D’Adda and Scorcu (2003). The analysis of 
the original Klein-Kosobud data by Mills suggested that Y/K was trend-stationary 
around downward trend, thus giving support to Klein and Kosobud’s paper. Results 
by D’Adda and Scorcu are mixed: while Y/K ratio appeared to be stationary for 
extended periods in the US and Germany, there was also a tendency for reduction in 
the levels of Y/K across economies, e.g. capital productivity in the “follower” 
economies (Italy, France etc.) was converging to that of leader economy (USA). In 
contrast, Madsen et al. provide more robust support of stationarity of capital 
productivity (observed in 15 out of 16 OECD economies). This is in line with earlier 
work by Romer (1989) who reported remarkably similar growth rates in output and 
capital stock in the US over 1870-1913, 1913-1950, and 1950-1979 periods. In the 
developing countries’ context Hofman (2000) considered capital productivity in Latin 
America. The mixed findings included increasing growth of capital productivity in 
few economies between 1950-80 and 1980-98 periods (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
Peru) and slowdown in capital productivity in other economies of the region.  
 
To provide theoretical account for the fall or slowdown of capital productivity, Foley 
and Michl (1999) pointed to the likelihood of labour-saving technical change over the 
course of economic development process. This respectively implies substitution of 
labour for capital, rising labour productivity in tandem with falling capital 
productivity (and hence impossibility of steady and trendless capital-output ratios). 
This argument was empirically tested for a set of developed and developing 
economies (King & Levine, 1994, pp. 22-23): the capital-output ratio was found to 
vary positively and significantly with income per capita. 
 
In light of mixed evidence, the analysis of the capital productivity dynamics requires 
further empirical investigation. Most recent studies of capital productivity relied on 
the application of up-to-date econometric tests: Gregory-Hansen cointegration test 
with single endogenous break (D’Adda & Scorcu, 2003), Perron-Vogelsang, 
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Clemente-Montanes-Reyes, and Carrion-i-Silvester tests (Madsen et al, 2012). This 
paper likewise uses a combination of methods to deliver robust conclusions - linear 
trend analysis with correction for serial correlation, error-correction (ECM) 
modelling with breaks, and univariate Lagrange Multiplier tests with up to two 
endogenously determined structural breaks. In contrast to other studies of capital 
productivity, the paper also looks at the relationship of capital productivity with other 
variables of interest and analyses capital productivity within a broader context of 
economic growth and productivity. 
 
3. Empirical results 
 
3.1 Data 
 
The data for this paper was obtained from European Commission AMECO database 
that collects national accounts data for respective European and selected non-
European economies. The original data is prepared by Eurostat or national statistic 
bodies. 
 
Capital productivity variable (AVGDK) is defined as the ratio of GDP at constant 
market prices to net capital stock at constant prices. The latter for any particular 
period was calculated using perpetual inventory method (PIM) and depreciation rates 
from respective national accounts, as net capital stock at constant prices in the 
previous period plus gross fixed capital formation at constant prices (total economy) 
minus consumption of fixed capital (total economy) divided by price deflator for 
gross fixed capital formation. Instead of assuming homogenous capital stock, separate 
estimates of the capital stock were obtained for structures (residential and non-
residential), equipment, agricultural assets, mineral exploration assets, and various 
intangible assets (Caselli & Wilson, 2004). The starting capital stock in the series was 
calculated assuming fixed K/Y ratio in 1960 (K/Y=3).  
 
We note that dynamics of capital productivity is intertwined with movements in 
labour productivity and capital intensity. These latter variables were considered and 
defined as follows. Labour productivity variable (RVGDE) was defined as the ratio 
of GDP at constant market prices to total employment in all domestic industries. The 
latter included both residents and non-residents, covered employed and self-employed 
persons, and was calculated as year average. Capital intensity variable (RKNDE) was 
defined as the ratio of net capital stock at constant prices to total employment in all 
domestic industries. 
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The period covered for each economy was set sufficiently long to examine variation 
of capital productivity, spanning 1960-2014. For other variables of interest that 
determine capital productivity the period covered 1961-2014 (labour productivity 
growth rates) and 1963-2014 for capital intensity growth rates. The paper considers 
following developed economies – Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and USA.  
 
3.2 Empirical results 
 
As a first step, the visual inspection of the series was performed (Figure 1). A number 
of economies demonstrated rising capital productivity (Belgium, Denmark, 
Luxembourg, UK, and USA). Capital productivity was falling in Austria, Greece, 
Italy, Spain and Portugal. Trendless patterns or random walk behavior appeared to 
characterize capital productivity in Australia, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Iceland and New Zealand. 
 
Figure 1. Capital productivity in industrialized economies (1961-2014) 
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As a second step, a trend model was estimated using semi-logarithmic equation as 
follows: 
 
ln it i itx c t    ,                                                                                                    (1) 
                                                                                                     
Where x  is a variable in question for country i , t  is the year of observation, and  it
is a random disturbance term. Parameter i  indicates the average annual change of 
variable  x  along the linear trend. To correct for possible autocorrelation, Prais-
Winsten iterative procedure is adopted (Canjels & Watson, 1997). 
 
It is acknowledged following Nelson and Kang (1984) that making assessments based 
on visual inspection of the series or estimation of the linear trend prior to 
consideration of the unit root properties of the series may be erroneous, due to the 
possibility of the spurious regression (or spurious cyclicality or breaks). On the other 
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hand, Canjels and Watson (1997) provide arguments in favour of AR models.  We 
therefore retain trend estimates to be interpreted in conjunction with other tests. 
  
The results of linear trend estimation are presented in Table 1. The negative trend in 
capital productivity was present in 9 out of 22 economies (statistically significant 
only in the case of Austria, Greece, Italy, Spain and Sweden). Positive and significant 
trend was identified in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, UK and the USA. 
The largest significant decline was experienced in Greece (-41.40%), the largest 
increase in Luxembourg (36.86%). 
 
Table 1. Trend estimates of capital productivity 
 
Country Trend 
Cumulative 
change (%) 
p-value rho Break Model 
Austria -0.0039 -20.44 0.00 0.86   TS 
Australia 0.0018 9.43 0.45 0.99     
Belgium 0.0011 5.72 0.09 0.82   TS 
Canada 0.0037 19.69 0.13 0.98     
Denmark 0.0026 13.96 0.02 0.88   TS 
France -0.0010 -5.52 0.11 0.86     
Finland 0.0003 1.70 0.86 0.92     
Germany 0.0009 4.55 0.04 0.67   TS 
Greece -0.0078 -41.40 0.00 0.93   TS 
Iceland 0.0014 7.59 0.36 0.86     
Ireland 0.0021 11.27 0.52 0.97     
Italy -0.0026 -13.63 0.08 0.94   TS 
Japan -0.0019 -10.14 0.47 0.97     
Luxembourg 0.0070 36.86 0.00 0.89   TS 
Netherlands 0.0012 6.20 0.29 0.93     
New Zealand 0.0009 4.62 0.35 0.79     
Portugal -0.0014 -7.49 0.71 0.99     
Spain -0.0059 -31.53 0.02 0.98   TS 
Sweden -0.0038 -20.33 0.08 0.97   TS 
Switzerland -0.0004 -2.09 0.83 0.98 1975-6   
UK 0.0036 19.01 0.00 0.84 2009 TS 
USA 0.0041 21.83 0.00 0.88   TS 
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Notes: TS indicates the presence of deterministic trend. 
 
As a third step, an error-correction model (ECM) was considered that avoids spurious 
results, by incorporating both trend-stationary and difference-stationary model 
components (Bleaney & Greenaway, 1993).  
 
The model equation is: 
 
1 1ln ln lnt t tx t x x                                                                                                                  (2) 
 
Where x is a respective variable,  is a trend coefficient, t  is a random disturbance 
term, and   is an error-correction term. The ECM model is correctly specified when
0 . The variable in question follows random walk with zero mean, when
0, 0   ; reverts to historical mean, when 0, 0   ; performs random walk 
with drift (i.e. has stochastic trend), when 0, 0    and 0 or 0 ; and 
reverts to non-zero deterministic trend, when 0, 0   , specifically 0, 0    
or 0, 0    .  In the fourth case, when trend was present, the annual rate of 
change of x along the trend was estimated as 1 . Also, the reliable guide as to 
the future behaviour of the series is obtained only in second and fourth case (i.e. 
series with no random walk). Standard t-ratio statistics is used to determine 
significance of all terms except 1ln tx  (in which case Dickey-Fuller unit root t-
statistics is used).  
 
Impulse or shift dummies were added to capture the break in the level or trend of the 
series. When heteroscedasticity was present and/or autocorrelation was not removed, 
ECM with Newey-West and/or Huber-White terms was estimated.  
    
ECM model results are presented in Table 2. The coefficient of error-correction term 
( ) was negative and hence the model was considered valid. Deterministic trend for 
capital productivity was observed in 11 economies based on t-statistics, and 3 
economies based on Dickey-Fuller statistics. The latter economies are Germany, UK 
and the US. Positive and significant trends in capital productivity were observed in 
Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Sweden, UK and the US). Negative 
significant trend were present in Austria, Australia, France, Japan, Portugal and 
Spain.  
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Table 2. Results of error-correction model 
Country δ 
p-
value 
  t-
statistics 
Break Trend R2 Notes Model 
Austria -0.0006 0.08 -0.140 -1.98 2009 -0.43 0.19   DT 
Australia -0.0005 0.01 -0.043 -1.25 1982 -1.09 0.48    ST 
Belgium -0.0001 0.45 -0.147 -1.78 1975 X 0.24    MR 
Canada -0.0001 0.47 -0.100 -2.44 1982 X 0.47    MR 
Denmark 0.0003 0.27 -0.143 -2.13 2009 X 0.19    MR 
France -0.0002 0.04 -0.106 -1.84 1975, 2009 -0.23 0.48    DT 
Finland 0.0005 0.03 -0.107 -2.40 1991, 2009 0.45 0.50    DT 
Germany 0.0005 0.00 -0.379 -4.34 2009 0.13 0.38  HW  DT 
Greece -0.0007 0.18 -0.152 -2.29 1974 X 0.21  HW  MR 
Iceland -0.0004 0.10 -0.188 -3.64 1967-8 -0.21 0.53    DT/MR 
Ireland 0.0006 0.03 -0.047 -1.70 2008 1.29 0.43    DT 
Italy -0.0005 0.05 -0.069 -1.12 1975, 2009 -0.67 0.40  NW  ST 
Japan -0.0010 0.00 -0.090 -2.41 1974, 2010 -1.09 0.59    DT 
Luxembourg 0.0012 0.07 -0.132 -1.90 2008-9 0.91 0.23    DT 
Netherlands 0.0002 0.18 -0.061 -1.34 2009 X 0.29    RW 
New Zealand -0.0002 0.37 -0.237 -2.83 1967 X 0.24    MR 
Portugal -0.0012 0.00 -0.105 -2.96 1975 -1.16 0.55    DT 
Spain -0.0010 0.01 -0.115 -2.99 2009 -0.90 0.55    DT 
Sweden 0.0003 0.10 -0.028 -0.80 2009 1.16 0.26  NW  ST 
Switzerland 0.0001 0.45 -0.011 -0.31 1975 X 0.52    RW 
UK 0.0008 0.01 -0.226 -3.25 1974 0.34 0.38    DT 
USA 0.0006 0.03 -0.206 -3.33 1982, 2009 0.30 0.34    DT 
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Notes: DT, ST, MR and RW indicate deterministic trend, stochastic trend, reversion to historical 
mean, and random walk respectively. X implies that trend coefficient is not significant and is 
considered to be zero. HW indicates Huber-White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors due to 
presence of heteroscedasticity. NW indicates Newey-West standard errors to overcome 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
The largest increase along deterministic trend was present in Ireland and Luxembourg 
(1.29% p.a. and 0.91% p.a.), while largest decrease took place in Portugal (-1.16% 
p.a). Series in Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Greece and New Zealand were reverting 
to historical mean, while series in Netherlands and Switzerland were following 
random walk. Capital productivity in Australia, Italy and Sweden was following 
stochastic trend. In the case of Iceland, ECM findings are inconclusive, with either 
deterministic trend or mean reversion possible. 
 
In the majority of cases, the correctly specified ECM was obtained if dummy 
variables (of impulse of shift form) representing structural breaks in series were 
included. These breaks largely correspond to country-specific or global economic 
events and developments. The breaks were principally located during business cycle 
troughs - global recession of 2008-10 (13 cases), recession of 1973-75 that followed 
1973 oil crisis and collapse of Bretton-Woods (8 cases), recession of the early 1980s 
in the USA (triggered by contractionary monetary policy), 1967-8 recession in 
Iceland (attributed to the fall in fish exports and decline in export prices), 1967 
recession in New Zealand (associated with the collapse of wool prices in international 
market). Breaks also represented major structural changes in respective economies 
(1991 in Finland, corresponding to collapse of COMECON and trade with Eastern 
bloc), and possibly political changes (such as 1974 break, indicating restoration of 
democratic rule in Greece). 
 
It is known that Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, upon which ECM is based, tends to 
have low power in the presence of structural breaks, and has bias towards non-
rejection of the unit root null. Lee and Strazicich (2003, 2004) Lagrange Multiplier 
(LM) tests adopted in this paper address this shortcoming, and also have other 
advantages: determine up to two structural breaks endogenously, and solve the 
problem of spurious rejections typical to other tests with breaks (consideration of 
time series as stationary when they are non-stationary with breaks).  
 
Lee-Strazicich LM tests are based on 
 
'
t t ty Z e                                                                                                                 (3) 
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and  
 
1t t te e                                                                                                                  (4) 
 
data-generating process, where ty  are series,   is coefficients’ vector, t  is error 
term, and tZ is a matrix of exogenous variables. While two models (A and C) are 
available for LM test, this paper uses C model as more general and encompassing 
Model A (Sen, 2003). In Model C, [1, , , ]t t tZ t D DT , i.e. allows for shift in intercept 
and change in the trend slope under aH . The LM unit root statistics is obtained from 
 
'
1tt t i t i tx d Z S x S         ,                                                                           (5) 
 
where   xt t t tS x Z
 
    , 2,...,t T ; 

  are coefficients in the regression of tx on 
tZ ; x

 is given by t tx Z  ; and 1x  and 1Z  are first observations of x  and Z . LM 
test statistics is derived assuming 0 : 0H  . The relevant structural breaks are grid 
searched over trimmed (0.1 ,0.9 )T T  region, where T is a sample size. The optimal 
lag length is determined through general-to-specific procedure (maximum number of 
lags of k=8, and 10% significance value of the last lag is equal to 1.645). The breaks 
are located where LM t-statistics is at the minimum.  
 
LM tests were implemented in a sequential manner. LM unit root test with two 
endogenous structural breaks (Model C) was run. The results of the test were 
considered final and series were seen as either trend stationary with two breaks or 
containing unit root with two breaks, if based on t-statistics critical values, one of the 
following held: 1) Two level ( jtB ) and two trend ( jtD ) dummies were significant; or 
2) Two trend dummies and one level dummy were significant; or 3) Two trend 
dummies were significant. In other cases, LM unit root test with one endogenous 
break was run. If the trend dummy was significant, the series were seen as either 
trend stationary with single or containing unit root with single break. 
  
The LM unit root tests with breaks demonstrate mixed results (Table 3). Up to two 
structural breaks were identified in all economies (single break in Austria, Finland, 
Ireland and Sweden).  
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Table 3. Lagrange Multiplier test results 
Country LM test (2 breaks) LM test (1 break) Model 
  
Break significance Break dates Break significance 
Break 
date   
Austria           -4.150 [8] D1 1983 URB 
Australia -4.844 [8] D1D2 1987 1991         URB 
Belgium -5.986** [4] B1D1B2D2 1979 2002         TSB 
Canada -4.603 [5] D1D2 1973 1997         URB 
Denmark -5.115 [8] D1B2D2 1986 1992         URB 
France -4.097 [6] D1D2 1973 1995         URB 
Finland           -3.956 [3] D1 1997 URB 
Germany -5.974** [1] D1D2 1987 1994         TSB 
Greece -4.586 [3] D1D2 1978 2000         URB 
Iceland -6.788* [3] B1D1D2 1985 2007         TSB 
Ireland           -5.642* [5] B1D1 1993 TSB 
Italy -5.710** [3] B1D1B2D2 1974 2005         TSB 
Japan -4.355 [4] B1D1D2 1978 1996         URB 
Luxembourg -4.996 [7] D1D2 1984 2002         URB 
Netherlands -4.177 [1] D1D2 1980 1998         URB 
New Zealand -6.450* [5] B1D1D2 1973 1998         TSB 
Portugal -7.461* [2] D1D2 1973 1988         TSB 
Spain -7.426* [4] B1D1D2 1973 1993         TSB 
Sweden           -4.785** [6] D1 1993 TSB 
Switzerland -5.966** [4] B1D1D2 1979 2003         TSB 
UK -5.117 [5] B1D1D2 1973 2001         URB 
USA -5.230 [1] D1D2 1980 1999         URB 
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Notes: B1, B2, D1 and D2 indicate significant level and trend break points at 5% significance level 
(for the first and second break respectively). Lags selected by general-to-specific procedure are shown 
in square brackets. Series are considered trend stationary with breaks at 5% significance level; symbol 
(*) indicates significance at 1% and symbol (**) significance at 10% levels. LM test (Model C with 1 
break) 5% critical values range from -4.45 to -4.51 depending on break location. LM test (Model C 
with 2 breaks) 5% critical values range from -5.59 to -5.73 depending on break location. 
The timing of these breaks had moderate correspondence with major events and 
developments – out of 40 breaks, only 1 break can be tallied with global recession of 
2008-10, further 7 breaks with 1973-4 recession, and another 7 with early-1980s 
recession. We acknowledge in this regard that LM is a test for unit root with break 
versus trend stationarity with breaks, rather than test for the timing of breaks, and 
hence breaks suggested by the test may have no or little relation to actual economic 
changes. Trend stationarity with break(s) was observed in Belgium, Germany, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. In 
other economies, capital productivity series were seen to contain unit root with 
break(s). 
 
The three types of estimates (linear trend with Preis-Winsten correction for 
autocorrelation; error-correction modelling; and Lee-Strazicich tests) tended to 
identify in many instances different behaviour in the series. Acknowledging that 
ECM and Lee-Strazicich tests are based on more robust methodologies (but that 
linear trend model and visual inspection may nonetheless provide insights as to the 
series’ patterns), the following conclusion is made as to the series. 1). If all three 
methods suggest significant trend (with or without breaks) in the series, the series are 
considered to be trend stationary (with or without breaks). The opposite holds if 
trends are not identified. 2). If either ECM or Lee-Strazicich test points to significant 
trend, while the other method does not, the conclusion is made based on linear trend 
model with correction for autocorrelation (i.e. whether this model suggests significant 
trend or not) and visual examination. 3). If both ECM and Lee-Strazicich test point to 
the significant trend, but this contradicts linear trend model and the “eyeball test”, 
statistically significant trend is deemed to be present. The rule will also apply to the 
opposite situation (i.e. if ECM and Lee-Strazicich indicate no trend, but linear trend 
model and visual observation do, no significant trend is seen to be present).  
 
We conclude overall that empirical results are mixed. Taking into account all three 
tests, capital productivity was following trend with breaks in 11 cases, and was 
reverting to historical mean or exhibiting stochastic patterns in other 11 cases. All 
three tests unequivocally indicated trend stationary with two breaks in Germany and 
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Spain, and non-stationary behaviour in Australia, Canada and Netherlands. Of these 
three economies, capital productivity in Canada was mean reverting (in line with 
balanced growth predictions), while in Australia and Netherlands series were 
following random walk or random walk with drift. In all other countries, tests yielded 
conflicting results and the decision was made as per aforementioned sequential 
procedure. Interpreting LM test and ECM results in conjunction, the mean reversion 
could also be identified in Denmark, Greece, and possibly New Zealand and Iceland. 
 
3.3 Economic significance 
 
The empirical results attest to a number of tendencies and developments taking place 
in the industrialised economies. 
 
The fall in capital productivity in several economies illustrates ongoing economic 
growth process and convergence to the steady-state as per Solow model in the long-
run (Jones & Manuelli, 1990). While arguably none of the OECD economies was in a 
steady state by 1960s (complete substitution of labour for capital and per capita 
income determined solely by technological factors), such economies as Japan, Italy, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain were the furthest away from the most advanced 
economies of the time (USA) as attested by the respective GDP per capita 
differentials. Falling capital productivity in these economies thus demonstrates lower 
per-capita capital stock in these economies at the beginning of the period and 
catching up proceeding at a higher speed than in the remainder of the economies 
considered. This result is in line with observations of capital productivity in Italy and 
Japan made by Feu (2003). The use of this theoretical cadre however leaves 
unexplained why capital productivity fell in Sweden and Switzerland (countries likely 
to be near or at steady state) and did not fall in Ireland and Iceland (countries that had 
similarly low GDP and capital per capita in the early 1960s). Overall, capital 
productivity estimates on AMECO set confirm results by D’Adda and Scorcu (2003) 
as to direction and general pattern of the variable for Japan, Italy, Netherlands, but 
not France, UK, USA and Germany. 
 
The levels and trends in capital productivity were also considered in terms of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the use of capital. The study by McKinsey Global 
Institute (1996) on capital productivity identifies German and Japan “productivity 
puzzles” (despite much saving and increase in labour inputs in Japan and capital-
deepening in Germany, the labour productivity levels lag behind US levels). Results 
of the analysis confirmed McKinsey’s “puzzles”: the levels of capital productivity 
 16 
 
(and efficiency of capital use) in these economies was much lower than in the US 
(indeed falling in Japan and virtually stable in Germany), translating into sizeable 
slowdowns in labour productivity (in contrast to rising Y/L in the US). In Germany, 
Japan and the US, the growth rates of capital productivity in 1964-69 were 4.78%, 
3.05% and 2.06% per annum, in 1990-99 were 0.50%, 1.06% and 2.01% per annum, 
and in 2000-09 were 0.35%, 0.755 and 1.33% per annum respectively. Results 
showed high level of Y/K on par with the US in Canada (due to tight economic 
integration) and higher than US level in Luxembourg (in line with higher GDP per 
capita and labour productivity). The lowest levels of Y/K were identified in Greece 
known for inefficient use of capital inputs particularly in agriculture (Polyzos & 
Arabatzis, 2006), and Sweden, where low capital productivity is due to high 
depreciation rates (specifically for period since the 1970s) used in AMECO (Perez & 
Garcia, 2014). 
 
The paper showed that in the short-run the movements in capital productivity and 
capital-labour ratio growth rates were attributed to business cycle fluctuations. 
Specifically, the segments of falling capital productivity coincided with recessions or 
periods of sluggish growth. This regularity applied to most economies (to smaller 
extent to Austria, Greece and Japan) with the exception of Portugal and Spain, where 
falls in capital productivity were driven more by structural and policy factors. Capital 
deepening was also accelerating during recessions, when the job destruction is the 
highest and opportunity costs of job reallocation and shedding are the lowest 
(Caballero & Hammour, 1996), resulting in capital productivity falls. Spikes in 
capital-labour ratio were observed in Canada, USA, Italy, Belgium, and Netherlands 
during three recessions of early 1980s, early 1990s and global financial crisis of 
2008-09. In other economies, capital-labour ratio increased during one or two major 
recessions, while in Japan, Germany and New Zealand capital-labour ratio was 
acyclical. 
 
Regarding factors underpinning capital productivity movements, Mohun (2009) 
identifies three drivers: 1). The relationship between growth in labour productivity 
and growth in capital intensity (capital deepening), with capital productivity falling 
when the latter exceeds the former and rising otherwise, as per identity relationship; 
2). Changes in the relative price of capital goods (rising prices lead to falling capital 
productivity); 3). The structure of capital stock (specifically the proportion of capital 
stock in productive versus non-productive and less productive activities, and the 
changing composition of aggregate capital stock).  
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Regarding the first factor, as shown in Table 4, growth in labour productivity was 
exceeding growth in capital intensity in 16 economies in the 1960s, 9 economies in 
the 1970s and the 1980s, 11 economies in the 1990s, 4 economies in the 2000s and 7 
economies in 2010s, indicating gradual deterioration of capital productivity in most 
economies. On the other hand, positive trends in capital productivity were present in 
many instances (the growth rates ratio ΔY/L:ΔK/L was greater than 100% in 16 
economies in the 1960s, and 11 economies in the 1990s, i.e. during the periods of 
likely growth or resurgence in capital productivity). 
 
This latter observation is in line with trend model results presented in Table 1 
(showing positive trends in capital productivity in 13 economies), and also the results 
presented by Mohun (2009) and Weiss (1998). 
 
If the whole period (1964-2014) is examined, capital productivity was far from 
stable: the growth rates ratio fell within (95%; 105%) band only in New Zealand, 
Portugal and the UK. On a decade-by-decade basis, the ratio fell within (95%; 105%) 
in Austria, Belgium, Germany and the UK in the 1970s, Finland and Iceland in the 
1980s, Finland, Luxembourg and Netherlands in the 1990s, and Austria in the 2000s. 
The ratio exceeded the band in all economies in the 1960s and the 2010s. 
 
This lack of stability in capital productivity (together with other discrepancies, such 
as slowing down and reversal of capital deepening, as shown in Table 5) may cast  
doubts about the presence of balanced growth in the OECD economies during the 
study period. 
 
Table 5 also shows that both labour productivity and capital intensity were both 
growing at a diminishing rate: labour productivity was slowing down in all 
economies, and capital intensity in all economies except Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and the USA (indeed in some of the economies capital deepening was put on 
halt, as was the case of Australia and Canada in the 1960s, Ireland in the 1990s and 
Switzerland in the 2000s). 
 
In addition, the actual movements in capital productivity did not appear to reflect 
factor input substitution. The substitution process implies that the rise in real wages 
encourages firms to substitute capital for labour, thereby increasing capital intensity 
of production and reducing capital productivity (the opposite changes will take place, 
if real wage falls).
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Table 4. Comparison of labour productivity and capital intensity average annual growth rates (ΔY/L and 
ΔK/L). 
 
Country 1964-2014 1964-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-14 
Austria 106.4 127.0 99.1 116.8 86.5 97.2 125.5 
Australia 117.2 227.8 69.4 112.4 231.2 36.3 126.7 
Belgium 108.7 107.3 100.9 106.5 88.6 61.7 -964.4 
Canada 106.5 87.4 80.1 91.3 -572.8 55.7 156.9 
Denmark 75.4 108.6 81.8 -16.7 110.9 118.7 -48.3 
France 74.2 128.1 73.9 91.7 53.6 28.4 50.2 
Finland 92.5 111.8 90.3 96.0 103.2 48.1 75.8 
Germany 87.7 124.9 103.5 90.3 81.1 0.8 42.1 
Greece 172.5 195.4 107.4 241.0 213.0 -50.7 142.7 
Iceland 105.3 114.0 87.7 96.3 420.2 66.9 86.9 
Ireland 87.2 113.5 87.7 69.6 87.7 63.5 67.3 
Italy 90.0 228.9 107.9 77.8 76.6 32.3 59.7 
Japan 101.0 90.2 92.0 112.2 126.1 107.3 57.4 
Luxembourg 83.0 75.5 54.1 79.6 97.1 111.5 280.1 
Netherlands 120.7 108.0 108.8 153.8 103.9 115.0 1242.6 
New Zealand 102.9 32.8 195.1 272.0 71.1 63.3 -3.3 
Portugal 95.4 109.0 50.3 80.1 44.7 -900.4 -74.9 
Spain 132.9 385.2 169.7 152.7 148.1 57.3 291.7 
Sweden 92.1 190.2 66.1 91.4 36.4 82.2 -618.4 
Switzerland 126.9 -2174.3 190.5 88.3 137.7 35.0 70.0 
UK 102.4 -1433.3 104.7 109.7 130.7 33.0 42.7 
USA 110.6 2623.9 2.3 80.6 320.2 76.8 64.0 
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Notes: The comparison is performed by constructing the ratio of labour productivity growth rate to 
capital intensity growth rate (expressed in percentages). Values equal to or close to 100 indicate 
similar or roughly similar growth rates in a specific period. 
As shown in Table 5, capital deepening was decelerating in 18 economies over 1964-
2014 period and proceeding at a sustained or increasing rate in the remaining four 
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA). In particular, over 1964-1989 period, 
deceleration took place in all economies except the above-mentioned as well as 
Portugal, and over 1990-99 period in all economies except Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Iceland, Sweden, UK, and the USA. However, the four Anglo-Saxon 
economies mentioned were the ones that witnessed negative growth in real wages 
(Western & Healy, 1999), while other economies only experienced slowdown in real 
wage growth (and some, such as Austria, Finland, Germany and the UK experienced 
solid growth). Also, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA experienced 
increased growing capital productivity despite sustained capital deepening. 
 
These apparent contradictions between actual movements in capital productivity on 
one hand and real wage, labour productivity and capital intensity changes on the other 
may be explained by reference to relative prices of capital and structure of capital 
stock.  
 
Regarding relative prices of capital and structure of capital stock, these factors were 
likely behind the reversal of capital productivity in the 1980s and the 1990s. On a 
decade-by-decade basis, the visual observation and analysis of trend segment 
suggests that the highest incidence of rising capital productivity was in the 1960s and 
the 1990s (14 cases each), followed by 1980s (9 instances), 2000s (3 instances), 
2010s (2 cases) and 1970s (1 case), implying preponderance of negative trends in 
capital productivity in the 1970s, followed by positive trends in the 1980-90s, and 
again sluggish capital productivity in the 2000s and 2010s (Weiss, 1998; Mohun, 
2009). As put by Eichengreen (2015) and Fisher (2006), capital goods prices were 
rising in the 1970s (due to the increased energy intensity of investment goods) and 
falling ever since, reaching the minimum in the 2000s. This was distorting the capital 
investment incentives (in the corporate sector in particular): firms were pushed to 
invest less in order to support underlying capital goods prices, resulting in higher 
capital productivity. We note that this price factor seems to explain well capital 
productivity movements in the 1980-90s, but less so in the 2000s (when capital prices 
fall reached its limits). 
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Table 5. Average annual growth rates in capital intensity and real wages. 
Country 
ΔK/L by decade (%) 
Real wages 
growth 
  
1964-
69 
1970-
79 
1980-
89 
1990-
99 
2000-
14 
1974-
82 
1983-
92 
Australia -0.16 1.32 1.04 1.90 2.19 1.30 -1.53 
Austria 4.90 3.95 2.71 2.35 0.95 2.61 1.98 
Belgium 3.51 3.26 1.78 1.85 0.68 2.90 0.29 
Canada -0.11 0.69 0.89 0.98 1.43 1.52 -0.11 
Denmark 1.97 2.53 1.29 0.92 1.24 1.70 1.15 
France 4.48 3.75 2.04 1.56 1.26 3.11 0.68 
Finland 5.03 4.29 2.46 2.26 0.85 1.17 2.19 
Germany 4.45 2.96 0.98 0.57 0.33 1.56 2.08 
Greece 8.78 6.07 1.50 1.15 1.82   
Iceland 2.64 1.92 0.41 1.73 2.17   
Ireland 5.05 4.92 4.01 -0.56 2.68 3.77 0.83 
Italy 4.57 3.05 2.01 2.00 1.25 2.41 1.83 
Japan 4.55 6.62 3.85 2.91 0.54 1.38 1.50 
Luxembourg 1.88 1.28 1.31 0.67 0.38   
Netherlands 4.16 3.35 1.50 0.36 1.31 0.94 0.70 
New Zealand 0.06 0.53 2.04 0.43 1.15 -0.41 -2.05 
Portugal 2.44 4.64 4.35 3.43 2.42   
Spain 4.59 5.58 2.54 2.06 2.73   
Sweden 4.69 2.98 1.95 2.60 0.98 0.22 0.83 
Switzerland 2.98 2.81 0.58 0.50 -0.25 0.67 0.87 
UK 2.84 2.15 1.34 1.86 0.64 1.01 2.76 
USA 0.54 0.65 0.90 1.36 1.69 -0.49 -0.74 
Notes: Values indicated in bold represent increasing growth rate in capital intensity over 1990-99 
period relative to 1980-89 period. Values shown in italics demonstrate acceleration of capital 
deepening over 1964-89 period. Growth in real wages is taken from Western and Healy (1998, Table 
1, p. 234). 
The resurgence of capital productivity in 1980-90s was also due to structural changes 
in capital and production. As put by Weiss (1998), the relative importance of capital 
intensive sectors (heavy industries, manufacturing) has been on decline, while 
services sector (that is less capital-intensive and requires lower capital inputs for a 
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given level of labour productivity) was growing in importance, thereby lifting 
economy-wide capital productivity. The counter-argument could be that services 
sector has lower productivity than manufacturing, and hence fall in capital intensity 
coupled with lower labour productivity in services may prevent capital productivity 
from rising.  
 
Another likely explanation of rising capital productivity is the growing importance of 
human capital and relative decline in the importance of physical capital, the latter 
being used in the calculation of capital productivity (McCloskey, 2016, p. 175). 
 
Also acknowledged is the possibility of capital intensity moving in tandem with 
labour productivity (i.e. higher capital intensity of production enhances labour 
productivity, due to more capital goods available for worker and hence capital 
productivity is stable), or alternatively of the growth in capital stock lagging behind 
employment growth (i.e. labour productivity growth rate exceeds capital intensity 
growth rate and capital productivity rises). In Netherlands and Ireland in the 1990s, 
capital productivity took sharp increase due to substantial increase in employment 
and active employment creation policies with capital accumulation lagging behind, 
reducing the rate of capital deepening (Ederveen et al, 2007). 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The stability of capital productivity variable has been part and parcel of the balanced 
growth theory and one of the stylized facts of balanced growth. The paper examined 
systematically the statistical properties of the variable in the industrialized economies 
and also considered capital productivity in relation to other economic growth 
variables, and more broadly as a variable in economic models. 
 
To this end a set of tests (trend analysis with autoregressive term, error-correction 
model and univariate Lagrange Multiplier tests) as well as qualitative analysis were 
performed. Overall, diverse capital productivity patterns were present: in half of the 
economies in the sample trend stationarity with breaks was identified, while in the 
other half capital productivity was following stochastic patterns or reverted to 
historical mean.  
 
In a broader theoretical context, the following results emerged. Firstly, for some of 
the “late-comer economies” capital productivity convergence to the US level was 
shown. Secondly, results seem to confirm some of the productivity puzzles, where 
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slack labour productivity was attributed to low capital productivity, in turn 
conditioned by microeconomic factors related to inefficient use of capital. Thirdly, in 
many cases capital productivity movements tracked well business cycle. 
 
As to the driving forces of capital productivity, the analysis revealed that the growth 
rates of labour productivity and of capital-labour ratios were not equal and the 
slowdown in the variables was observed, thereby confirming tests results that 
balanced growth was unlikely. The effect of real wages and the capital-labour 
substitution played minor role in explaining capital productivity movements. In 
contrast, the decline in capital goods’ prices and changing economic structure and 
composition of the capital stock could be an important factor behind capital 
productivity resurgence in the 1980-90s.  
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